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Abstract
This paper extends the model proposed by Goodhart, Sunirand, and Tsomocos (2003,
2004a, b) to an infinite horizon setting. Thus, we are able to assess how the model conforms
with the time series data of the U.K. banking system. We conclude that, since the model
performs satisfactorily, it can be readily used to assess financial fragility given its flexibility,
computability, and the presence of multiple contagion channels and heterogeneous banks
and investors.
JEL Classification: C68; E4; E5; G11; G21
Keywords: Financial Fragility; Systemic Risk; U.K. Banking System; Default
1 Introduction
In a companion paper [Goodhart, Sunirand, and Tsomocos (2004b)], we describe a model
to assess risk for banking systems. We have demonstrated that such a model is not only rich
enough to incorporate active heterogeneous banks, incomplete markets and endogenous default,
but also suﬃciently flexible to be calibrated against real UK banking data. In particular, the
model comprises of three heterogeneous banks, two of which can be selected to represent any
individual banks whereas the third represents the aggregate of the remaining banks in the
banking system. We argue, therefore, that the model can, at least in principle, be used as
practical procedures for examining the financal stability of banking systems in any country.
However, a limitation of the model presented in Goodhart et al. (2004b) is that it has
only two periods. This implies that although it can be calibrated against real data to replicate
realistic features of the UK banking system at a specific point in time, its level of complexity
is not enough to provide an independent check whether it can capture the main time series
properties of these UK banks. The main objective of this paper, therefore, is to extend our
model to an infinite-horizon setting, thereby allowing us to investigate empirically how well
the simulation results from our extended model can capture the real behaviour of these banks
over time. Given that the model is shown to perform well on this front, we argue that it is
well-suited as a tool to analyse financial fragility in the UK banking system not only because
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it allows contagion eﬀects between heterogeneous agents to operate actively in equilibrium but
also because it can illuminate how such eﬀects may get amplified and propagated over time.
Typicially, standard dynamic models which have an active role for banks assume that the
horizon over which rational banks maximise their expected discount profits is infinite. Put
diﬀerently, bank managers are assumed to behave as if they were shareholders and therefore
care about the expected profits over the expected lifetime of the banks. We would, however,
argue that, owing to a standard conflict of interest between banks’ managers and shareholders,
the former may have an incentive to take into account the expected profits of their banks only
up to a finite horizon, depending on the number of periods at which they expect to remain
in charge of their banks. As will be formally argued in the next section, this is equivalent to
assuming that the values of the discount factors of these banks’ managers beyond a certain
finite horizon become infinitesimally small, i.e. approaching zero. Without loss of generality,
we assume for simplicity in our model that such a horizon is equal to one period. So, at
the end of period t, banks make their optimal decisions on their portfolios to maximise their
expected period t+ 1 level of profits. As time approaches the end of period t+ 1, depending
on the realisation of the actual state of nature, the outcome from such decisions is realised,
which in turn serves as inputs for these banks in making their optimal decisions in the current
period. In principle, the horizon over which banks optimise their expected profits can be
extended to multiple periods. However, owing to the simple nature of the one-period horizon
assumption and, as we shall see, since our simulation results indicate that the time-series
properties implied by our model match with those of the real data reasonably well, we shall
stick with this assumption throughout the rest of this paper.
As in Goodhart et al. (2004b), given the lack of disaggregated households’ and investors’
data, we do not explicitly model private agents’ optimisating behaviours. Instead, we assume
that they are captured by various reduced-form equations relating their actions to a variety
of economic variables such as GDP and interest rates, etc. Thus, our model incorporates not
only various feedback channels arising from interactions between heterogeneous banks, but also
between the banking system and the real economy.
The organisation of the paper is as follows. The next section formally provides a rationale
for the argument that banks’ managers may choose to maximise their banks’ expected profits
over a finite horizon. Section 3 presents the model whereas section 4 explains our calibration
and simulation methodology. Section 5 then shows the results. Section 6 provides concluding
remarks.
2 Modelling finite-horizon banks’ optimisation problem
This section formally provides an economic justification why the horizon over which bank man-
agers choose to optimise their bank’s profits may be finite. Consider a bank’s manager who
has joined bank b since period 0. At the end of period t, he maximises the bank’s expected
discounted payoﬀ, which is a quadratic function of profits minus (non-pecuniary) capital vio-
lation and default penalties, over the remaining infinite horizon subject to the balance sheet
constraint.1 The maximisation problem is as follows:
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1The setting of default and capital violation penalties will be explained in detail in section 3.
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∆(x) ≡ the diﬀerence between RHS and LHS of inequality (x),
cb ≡ coeﬃcient of risk aversion in the utility function of bank b,
λbk ≡ capital requirements’ violation penalties imposed on bank b,
k
b
t+1 ≡ capital adequacy requirement for bank b in period t+ 1,
λb ≡ default penalties on bank b,
µbt ≡ amount of money that bank b owes in the interbank market in period t,
dbt ≡ bank b’s interbank lending in period t,
µbd,t ≡ amount of money that bank b owes in the deposit market in period t,
vbt+1 ≡ repayment rates of bank b to all its creditors in period t+ 1,
mbt ≡ amount of credit that bank b extends in the loan market in period t,
Abt ≡ the value of market book held by bank b in period t,
ebt ≡ amount of capital that bank b holds in period t,
ebt+1 ≡ amount of capital that bank b holds in period t+ 1,
Othersbt ≡ the ‘others’ item in the balance sheet of bank b,
rbt ≡ lending rate oﬀered by bank b in period t,
rbd,t ≡ deposit rate oﬀered by bank b in period t,
ρt ≡ interbank rate in period t,
rAt ≡ the rate of return on market book in period t,
vh
b
t+1 ≡ repayment rates of agent hb in the loan market in period t+ 1,eRt+1 ≡ the rate of repayment that banks expects to get from its interbank lending in period
t+ 1,
ω ≡ risk weight on consumer loans,eω ≡ risk weight on market book, and
ω ≡ risk weight on interbank investment.
We assume that the manager has a particular opportunity cost for working in the bank. He
has the option of leaving the bank and seeking alternative employment when he has attained a
certain level of profitability. In other words, the manager will be approached by other financial
institutions and be oﬀered a better contract (e.g. higher salary) if his existing bank’s level of
profits is higher than a benchmark level, which we define as π¯. So, in period t + i, if πt+i is
greater than or equal to the benchmark level, πt+i ≥ π¯, the manager will leave the bank for a
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better contract.2 However, if πt+i is less than the benchmark level, πt+i < π¯, he will remain
with the bank. Therefore, the manager’s discounted factor associated with period t+ i can be
described as follows:
βt+i =
βt+i
(π¯ − π¯t+i)
max[(π¯ − π¯t+i) , 0] (4)
In period t+i, if πt+i < π¯, the manager remains with the bank, implying that the associated
discount factor is βt+i. On the contrary, if πt+i ≥ π¯, the manager leaves the bank and therefore
will no longer care about the bank’s profitability in period t + i and the subsequent periods,
i.e. βt+i = βt+i+1 = ... = βt+∞ = 0. We are now able to state the following proposition:
Proposition 1 There exist λb ∈ (0,∞] and λbk ∈ (0,∞] such that the infinite horizon function
(1) is equivalent to Et
t¯−1P
i=0
βt+iΠbt+i for some t¯ ∈ T .
Proof. The first order condition of the maximisation problem with respect to vbt yields:
πbt =
·
1− λb + λ
b
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¸
. Thus, by continuity, there
exist λb small enough and λbk large enough so that π
b
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since the value of the risk weighted asset [ωvh
b
t (1 + r
b
t−1)m
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t−1 + ω eRtdbt−1(1 + ρt−1) + eω(1 +
rAt−1)A
b
t−1] < +∞.3 Recall that πbt depends positively on λbk and negatively on λb. Therefore,
β t¯ = β t¯+1 = ... = β t¯+∞ = 0. It follows immediately that (1) reduces to Et
t¯−1P
i=0
βt+iΠbt+i.
In sum, we have demonstated that, under certain conditions, bank’s managers may choose
to maximise the expected profits of their existing banks only over a finite horizon since they
may depart from these banks for better alternative contracts, or at the latest on retirement.
For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we shall assume throughout the remaining of this
paper that such a horizon is equal to one period.
3 The Model
The model has three heterogeneous banks, b ∈ B = {γ, δ, τ}, four private sector agents,
h ∈ H = {α,β, θ,φ}, a Central Bank and a regulator. The time horizon extends over infinite
periods, t ∈ T = {1, ...,∞}. At each future date, we assume further that there are two possible
states of nature, s ∈ S = {i, ii}. State i is a normal/good state whereas state ii represents an
extreme/crisis event. Moreover, in each period, the probability that state i will occur in the
next period is denoted by p. As mentioned in the previous section, we assume that the horizon
over which banks maximise their expected profits is one period. More specifically, at the end
of period t, banks maximise their expected period t+1 profits, where the expectation is taken
over the two possible states.
As in Goodhart et al. (2003, 2004a and b), we assume that individual bank borrowers are
assigned during the two periods, by history or by informational constraints, to borrow from a
2Of course, if the manager departs, another one replaces him and the same argument is repeated. Alterna-
tively, we might have assumed that the bank’s policy is reviewed every year at the annual meeting of its board
of directors.
3The proof that bank’s choice variables are bounded away from infinity is contained in Goodhart, Sunirand,
and Tsomocos (2003).
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1. Borrow and deposit in the interbank markets (B) 
2.  OMOs (CB) 
3. Borrow and deposit in the commercial bank loan 
and deposit markets (B and H) 
Nature decides which of the s∈S occurs  
1. Settlement of loans and deposits (H and B) 
2. Settlement of interbank loans and deposits (CB and B) 
3. Default and capital requirements’ violation settlement  
All the financial markets re-open. 
CB= Central Bank 
B   = Commercial Banks 
H   = Households 
t 
t+1 All banks’ profits are realised and added to their 
capital as retained earnings 
Figure 1: The timeline of the model
single bank (i.e. a limited participation assumption).4 Given this assumption, together with
our set-up of a system of three heterogeneous banks, we need at least three borrowers. We
therefore assume that agents α,β, and θ borrow from banks γ, δ, and τ , respectively. The
remaining agent, Mr. φ, represents the pool of depositors in this economy who supplies funds
to every bank. This implies that we have multiple active markets for deposits (by separate
bank) and for loans (by borrower and bank). In addition, in each period, we also assume
a single, undiﬀerentiated, interbank market where deficit banks are allowed to borrow from
surplus banks, and wherein the Central Bank conducts open market operations (OMOs).
The time structure of the model is presented in figure 1. At the end of period t, loan,
deposit and interbank markets open. Banks decide how much to lend/borrow in each market,
expecting rationally any one of the two possible future scenarios to be realised in period t+1.
Moreover, the Central Bank also conducts OMOs in the interbank market. In the beginning
of period t+ 1, depending on the state which actually occurs, all financial contracts signed in
the previous period are settled, subject to any defaults and/or capital requirements’ violations,
which are then penalised. All banks’ profits are realised, which are then added as retained
earnings to their capital. At the end of the period t+ 1, given the new level of capital, all the
financial markets re-opens.
4 In Bhattacharya, Goodhart, Sunirand and Tsomocos (2003), we show that restricted participation in the
loan market can also arise as an equilibrium outcome given that the objective functions of banks also include a
relative performance criterion, i.e. a preference to outperform their competitors.
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3.1 Banking Sector
As mentioned, the banking sector comprises three heterogeneous bank, b ∈ B = {γ, δ, τ},
each is distinguished by its unique portfolio deriving from diﬀerent capital endowment and
risk/return preferences. Every bank is assumed to operate under a perfectly competitive en-
vironment (i.e. they take all interest rates as exogenously given when making their optimal
portfolio decisions). The structure of their balance sheets is given below:
Assets Liabilities
Loans to agents Deposits from Mr.φ
Interbank deposits Interbank borrowing
Market book Equity
Others
We assume that all banks endogenise their decisions in the loan, deposit and interbank
markets.5 6 Although we do not model separated bank equity markets, the value of bank
capital is endogenous in the model since it represents the amount of capital carried over from
the previous period, i.e the amount of capital that banks initially brought to the table plus
retained earnings.7 The exception, however, is the initial period where we need to start them oﬀ
with some exogenous capital endowment in order to allow them to begin their operations. The
remaining variables are treated as exogenous.8 We further assume that banks in our model can
default on their financial obligations, subject to default penalties set by the regulator. Thus,
by varying the penalties imposed on default from 0 to infinity, we can model 100% default, no
default or an equilibrium level of default between 0 and 100%.9 At first sight, this ‘continuous’
default rate approach may seem problematic since in reality banks either repay in full at the
due date or are forced to close down. However, we interpret a bank’s default rate in our model
as a probability that such bank chooses to shut down, and hence in the short run to default
completely on its financial obligations. For example, a default rate of 4 percent implies that
there is roughly a 4 percent chance of a shut down and a 96 percent chance that the bank
will repay in full and continue its normal operation. Therefore, a bank’s decision to increase
its default rates is isomorphic to its decision to adopt a riskier position in pursuit of higher
expected profitability.10 Finally, as in Bhattacharya et al. (2003), we make a simplifying
assumption by assuming that banks’ default rates in the deposit and interbank markets are
the same, i.e. banks are restricted to repay all their creditors similarly.
Analogous to the modelling of default, banks can violate their capital adequacy requirement,
subject to capital requirement violation penalties set by the regulator. In principle, each
5The modelling of the banking sector follows Shubik and Tsomocos (1992) and Tsomocos (2003a and b).
6We note that, in equilibrium, each bank will either be an interbank borrower or lender.
7Put diﬀerently, we assume that the cost of issuing new capital is prohibitively costly and that banks do not
pay any dividend to their shareholders.
8Given the present set-up, we cannot endogenise banks’ decisions on market book or equity. This is because
the model has two states in the second period and one unconstrained asset (i.e. an asset that banks can either
go infinitely short or long), which is the interbank market investment. By adding another unconstrained asset,
markets would be complete. In principle, our model can be extended to incorporate additional states in the
second period and therefore can be used to study the economic eﬀects on the market (trading) book. For
example, we can disaggregate the market book into two components according to their riskiness (or rating) and
endogenise banks’ decisions on these variables. This would allow us to study the endogenous response of risk
premia on corporate debt to a series of shocks. However, we face a practical problem on this front since there
are insuﬃcient data on the composition of the market book by category, e.g. rating, maturity, and currency.
9This modelling of default follows Shubik and Wilson (1977).
10For more on this issue, see work in progress by Tsomocos and Zicchino (2004).
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bank’s eﬀective capital to asset ratios may not be binding, (i.e. their values may be above
the regulator’s requirement), in which case they are not subject to any capital requirement
penalty. However, in our calibration/simulation exercise, we assume for simplicity that each
bank wants to keep a buﬀer above the required minimum, so that there is a non-pecuniary
loss of comfort and reputation as capital declines; in this sense the ratios are always binding.
Put diﬀerently, we assume that banks’ self-imposed ideal capital holdings are always above the
actual values of all banks’ capital to asset ratios. Given this assumption, we can rule out corner
equilibria and therefore focus our analysis entirely on well-defined interior solutions whereby
banks violate their enhanced capital requirements. Moreover, we assume that penalties are
linear as capital declines from its ideal level. Formally, we describe the optimisation problems
of these banks below.
3.1.1 Banks’ optimisation problem
At the end of period t, bank b ∈ B maximises its expected payoﬀ, which is a quadratic function
of its expected profitability in the next period minus non-pecuniary penalties that it has to
incur if it defaults on its deposit and interbank obligations. It also suﬀers a capital violation
penalty proportional to its capital requirement violation. Expectation is taken rationally over
two possible states of nature in period t+ 1. Formally, the optimisation problem of bank b in
period t is as follows:
max
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ps ≡ probability that state s ∈ S will occur,
cbs ≡ coeﬃcient of risk aversion in the utility function of bank b ∈ B,
7
λbks ≡ capital requirements’ violation penalties imposed on bank b ∈ B in state s ∈ S ,
k
b
t+1,s ≡ capital adequacy requirement for bank b ∈ B in period t+1 if state s ∈ S occurs,
λbs ≡ default penalties on bank b ∈ B in state s ∈ S,
vbt+1,s ≡ repayment rates of bank b ∈ B to all its creditors in period t + 1 if state s ∈ S
occurs,
ebt+1,s ≡ amount of capital that bank b ∈ B holds in period t+ 1 if state s ∈ S occurs,
vh
b
t+1,s ≡ repayment rates of agent hb ∈ Hb = {αγ,βδ, θτ} to his nature-selected bank b ∈ B
in the loan market in period t+ 1 if state s ∈ S occurs,eRt+1,s ≡ the rate of repayment that banks expects to get from its interbank lending in
period t+ 1 if state s ∈ S occurs.
Equation (5) implies that, at the end of period t, the assets of bank b ∈ B, which consist
of its credit extension, interbank lending, and market book investment, must be equal to
its liabilities obtained from interbank and deposit borrowing and its equity, where ‘Othersb’
represents the residual. Equations (6) and (7) then show that, dependent on which of the
s ∈ S actually occurs, the profit that bank b incurs in the next period is equal to the diﬀerence
between the amount of money that it receives from its asset investment and the amount that
it has to repay on its liabilities, adjusted appropriately for default in each market. As shown
in equation (8), the profit earned is then added to its initial capital, which in turn becomes
its capital in period t+ 1. Finally, equation (9) implies that the capital to asset ratio of bank
b in period t + 1 if state s ∈ S occurs is equal to the corresponding ratio of capital to the
risk-weighted assets.
3.2 Central Bank and Regulator
The Central Bank’s and the regulator’s decisions are exogenous. The Central Bank and the
regulator may, but need not, be a single institution. The Central Bank conducts monetary
policy by engaging in open market operations in the interbank market. We assume that, in
each period, the Central Bank sets the interbank rate as its monetary policy instrument. In
doing so, it can either supply base money, Mt ≥ 0, or issue government bond, B¯t ≥ 0, but not
both at the same time, to clear the interbank market.
The regulator sets capital adequacy requirements in state s ∈ S of the next period for all
banks (k
b
t+1,s, b ∈ B) as well as imposes penalties on their failures to meet such requirements
(λbks, b ∈ B, s ∈ S) and on default on their financial obligations in the deposit and interbank
markets (λbs, b ∈ B, s ∈ S). Finally, he also sets the risk weights on consumer loan, interbank
and market book investment (ω,ω, eω).
3.3 Private agent sector
In each period, household borrower hb, hb ∈ Hb = {αγ,βδ, θτ}, demands consumer loans from
his nature-selected bank b and chooses the default rate on his loans for each of the two possible
states, s ∈ S, in the next period. The remaining agent, Mr. φ, supplies his deposits to each
bank b ∈ B. As mentioned, we do not explicitly model the optimisation problems of households.
The reason is that it is very diﬃcult, if at all possible, to find real disaggregated data for
private agent sectors, e.g. the monetary and goods endowment of each banks’s borrowers
and depositors. This latter is particularly important since one of the key objectives of this
paper is take our model to real data. So, instead of explicitly providing microfoundations for
households’ decisions, we endogenise them by assuming the following reduced-form equations.
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3.3.1 Household Borrowers’ Demand for Loans
Because of the limited participation assumption in every consumer loan market, each house-
hold’s demand for loans in period t is a negative function of the corresponding lending rate
oﬀered by his nature-selected bank. In addition, his demand for loans also depends positively
on the expected GDP in the subsequent period. Put diﬀerently, we implicitly assume that
household borrowers rationally anticipate GDP in both states of the next period, which then
determines their expected future income, and adjust their loan demand in this period accord-
ingly in order to smooth their consumption over time. As in Goodhart et al. (2003, 2004a and
b), our money demand function manifests the standard Hicksian elements whereby it responds
positively to current and expected income and negatively to interest rates. Finally, in order to
improve the empirical fit, we introduce a linear time trend in each household borrower’s loan
demand function. As will be explained in the next section, the UK banking data that we use
in our calibration exercise is from 1997-2003. So, we define a linear time trend variable ‘trend’,
which has the value of 0 in 1997, 1 in 1998, and so on.
Specifically, we assume the following functional form for household hb’s loan demand in
period t from his nature-selected bank b, ∀hb ∈ Hb, and b ∈ B :
ln(µh
b
t ) = ahb,1 + ahb,2trend+ ahb,3 ln[p(GDPt+1,i) + (1− p)GDPt+1,ii] + ahb,4rbt (10)
where,
µh
b
t ≡ amount of money that agent hb ∈ Hb chooses to owe in the loan market of bank
b ∈ B in period t, and
GDPt+1,s ≡ Gross Domestic Product in period t+ 1 if state s ∈ S occurs.
3.3.2 Mr. φ’s Supply of Deposits
Unlike the loan markets, we do not assume limited participation in the deposit markets. This
implies that Mr. φ can choose to diversify his deposits with every bank. Thus, Mr. φ’s deposit
supply with bank b in period t depends not only on the corresponding deposit rate oﬀered by
bank b but also on the rates oﬀered by the other banks. Moreover, since banks in our model
can default on their deposit obligations, the expected rate of return on deposit investment of
Mr. φ with bank b has to be adjusted appropriately for its corresponding expected default rate.
Finally, Mr. φ’s deposit supply is a positive function of the expected GDP in the subsequent
period.
In sum, since his deposit decisions determine his investment portfolio, given the expected
rates of return, he diversifies among the existing deposit markets. Mr. φ’s deposit supply
function with bank b, ∀b ∈ B, in period t is as follows:
ln(dφb,t) = zb,1 + zb,2 ln[p(GDPt+1,i) + (1− p)GDPt+1,ii] + zb,3[r
b
d,t(pv
b
t+1,i + (1− p)vbt+1,ii)]
+zb,4
X
b´6=b∈B
[rb´d,t(pv
b´
t+1,i + (1− p)vb´t+1,ii)] (11)
where,
dφb,t ≡ amount of money that agent φ chooses to deposit with bank b ∈ B in period t.
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3.3.3 Households’ Loan Repayment Rates
We assume that each household’s repayment rate on his loan obligation to his nature-selected
bank for each of the two possible states of period t + 1, s ∈ S, is a positive function of the
corresponding GDP level as well as the aggregate credit supply available in the previous period.
The latter variable captures the eﬀect of ‘credit crunch’ in the economy whereby a fall in the
overall credit supply in the economy aggravates the default probability of every household.11
Specifically, the functional form of the repayment rate of household hb, ∀hb ∈ Hb, to his
nature-selected bank b ∈ B, in state s ∈ S of period t+ 1 is as follows:
ln(vh
b
t+1,s) = ghb,s,1 + ghb,s,2 ln(GDPt+1,s) + ghb,s,3[ln(m¯
γ
t ) + ln(m¯
δ
t ) + ln(m¯
τ
t )] (12)
3.4 GDP
GDP in each state of period t+ 1 is assumed to be a positive function of the aggregate credit
supply available in the previous period. Since the Modigliani-Miller proposition does not hold
in our model12, higher credit extension as a result of loosening monetary policy, or any other
shocks, generates positive eﬀects, e.g. a real balance eﬀect, that raises consumption demand
and ultimately GDP. Finally, we introduce a linear time trend to improve the empirical fit.
The following functional form for GDP in state s ∈ S of period t+ 1 (GDPt+1,s) holds:
ln(GDPt+1,s) = us,1 + us,2trend+ us,3[ln(m¯
γ
t ) + ln(m¯
δ
t ) + ln(m¯
τ
t )] (13)
3.5 Market Clearing Conditions
There are seven active markets in the model (three consumer loan, three deposit and one
interbank markets). Each of these markets determines an interest rate that equilibrates demand
and supply in equilibrium.13
1 + rbt =
µh
b
t
mbt
, hb ∈ Hb,∀b ∈ B (i.e. bank b’s loan market clears) (14)
1 + rbd,t =
µbd,t
dφb,t
,∀b ∈ B (i.e. bank b’s deposit market clears)(15)
1 + ρt =
B¯t +
P
b∈B
µbt
Mt +
P
b∈B
dbt
(i.e. interbank market clears)(16)
We note that these interest rates, i.e. rbt , r
b
d,t, and ρt, b ∈ B, are the ex ante nominal interest
rates that incorporate default premium since default is permitted in equilibrium. Their eﬀective
(ex post) interest rates have to be suitably adjusted to account for default in their corresponding
markets.14
11Higher interest rates, given that households are liquidity constrained, ultimately increase their debt obliga-
tions in the future. Hence, defaults rise.
12See Goodhart et al. (2003) for an extensive discussion.
13The interest rate formation mechanism is identical to the oﬀer-for-sale mechanism in Dubey and Shubik
(1978). The denominator of each of the expressions (14-16) represents the supply side whereas the numerator
divided by (1 + r), r ∈ {rb, rbd, ρ}, b ∈ B corresponds to the demand. Note that this interest rate formation
mechanism is well-defined both in, and out of, equilibrium.
14For more on the method of calculating the ex post interest rates, see Shubik and Tsomocos (1992).
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3.6 Equilibrium
Let σb = {mbt , µbt , dbt , µbd,t, vbt+1,s,πbt+1,s, ebt+1,s, kbt+1,s} ∈ R+×R+×R+×R+×R2+×R2×R2×R2
for b ∈ B; σhb ≡ (µhbt , vh
b
t+1,s) ∈ R+ × R2+ for hb ∈ Hb and ; σφ ≡ (dφb ) ∈ R+ for b ∈ B;
and GDPt+1,s ∈ R2. Also, let η ∈ {rγt , rτt , rδt , rγd,t, rτd,t, rδd,t,Mt, B¯t}, Bb(η) = { σb : (5) − (9)
hold }.We say that ((σb)b∈B, η, (σhb)hb∈Hb ,σφ, (GDPt+1,s)s∈S) is a monetary equilibrium with
commercial banks and default for the economy
E{(ebt , Othersb, Ab)b∈B; p; (kbt+1,s,λbs,λbks,ω,ω, eω)b∈B,s∈S; rAt ; ρ}
iﬀ:
(i) σb ∈ Argmax
σb∈Bb(η)
Et
¡
Πbt+1(π
b
t+1)
¢
, b ∈ B
(i.e. all banks optimise.)
(ii) All markets (14)-(16) clear.
(iii) eRs =
P
b∈B
vbt+1sµ
b
tP
b∈B
µbt
, s ∈ S
(i.e. All banks are correct in their expectation about the repayment rates that they gets
from their interbank lending.)
We emphasise here that the equilibrium conditions (i)−(iii) are consistent with the defining
properties of a competitive equilibrium with rational expectations.
(iv) σh
b
, σφ and GDPt+1,s, for h ∈ H and s ∈ S satisfy the reduced-form equations
(10)-(13).
(i.e. loan demand, deposit supply, repayment rates, and GDP in both states satisfy the
reduced-form equations (10)-(13).)
4 Calibration and Simulation Methodology: The UK banking
sector
In this section we demonstrate how the model developed in the previous section can be applied
to simulate the behaviour of UK banks over time. The analysis is based primarily on the
annual account data of UK banks, which are available from 1997 to 2003. We assume that the
banking sector comprises of seven largest UK banks measured in terms of their total assets as
at end of 2003 (i.e. Abbey National, Barclays, HBOS, HSBC, Lloyds, Royal Bank of Scotland,
Standard Chartered) and other major banks which have either been merged with or acquired
by these seven banks over the sample period (i.e. Nat West, Bank of Scotland, and Halifax).15
We have chosen banks γ and δ to represent specifically two of these banks which have never
15During 1997-2003, there have been two major mergers and acquisitions (M&A) between UK banks. In
March 2000, Royal Bank of Scotland acquired Nat West. In September 2001, Halifax and Bank of Scotland
merged and since then has become HBOS. Other minor M&As include, for example, the acquisition of Woolwich
by Barclays in 2000. However, due to the lack of market book data for Woolwich and that the size of Woolwich
is relatively small compared to that of Barclays at the time of acquisition, we ignore this M&A.
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encountered any merger and acquisition over the sample period. However, owing to the data
confidentiality reason, we do not reveal their identities. Bank τ then represents the aggregate
of the remaining active banks in the banking sector at each point in time. For example, Nat
West is considered as part of bank τ only from 1997 to 1999, after which it no longer exists as
it was acquired by Royal Bank of Scotland in March 2000.
To simulate the time-series property of UK banks, the following subsection explains how we
first calibrate our model against the real data to capture realistic features of the UK banking
sector as at the end of 1997, the period from which the data became available. Taking this
as the starting point, subsection 4.2 then describes how we employ our model to simulate the
behaviour of these UK banks in the subsequent periods, thereby allowing us to assess how their
positions in the loan, deposit, and interbank markets endogenously evolve over time.
4.1 Calibration
Our calibration procedure follows directly that presented in Goodhart, Sunirand, and Tsomocos
(2004b). In each period t, excluding the Lagrange multipliers, conditions (i) − (iv) in the
previous section imply that we have a system of 56 equations in 143 unknown variables, 87
of which are exogenous variables/parameters in the model.16 This implies that there are 87
variables whose values have to be chosen in order to obtain a numerical solution to the model.
Thus, they represent the degrees of freedom in the system and can either be set appropriately
or calibrated against the real data. In particular, we choose the values of these variables
such that they capture realistic features of the UK banking sector in 1997. It is important
to note that these variables, which are exogenous when solving the system of equations, do
not necessarily have to be those which are exogenous in the model.17 We report the values of
exogenous parameters/variables in the model and the resulting initial equilibrium in table I.
The table also summarises whether the value of each variable reported is (1) calibrated against
real data, (2) arbitrarily selected, or (3) endogenously solved. We note, however, that, owing to
the data confidentiality reason, we suppress those numbers which are based on the calibrated
balance sheet data of UK banks and replace them by ‘xxx’. Unless stated otherwise, the values
of all the nominal variables reported therein, e.g. all bank balance sheet items, are normalised
by 1010.
16As mentioned, banks are endowed with some capital in the initial period. Thus it is an exogenous variable
in the model. However, as will be discussed in the next subsection, bank capital becomes endogenous in the
subsequent periods.
17For example, the Central Bank in our model fixes the interbank interest rate and lets base money adjust
endogenously. However, we can first choose the value of base money and let the system of equations determine
endogenously the value of the interbank rate that supports the preset value of base money.
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Table I: Exogenous variables and the resulting initial equilibrium
in the initial period (t = 1997)
Initial Equilibrium Exogenous variables in the model
rγt =0.099 k
δ
t+1,i=0.17 e
γ
t+1,ii=0.74 Other
γ
t =1.482 aαγ ,1=-3.94 c
γ
ii=0.35
rδt=0.105 k
δ
t+1,ii=0.15 e
δ
t+1,i=2.95 Other
δ
t=1.411 aβδ,1=-3.42 c
δ
i=0.12
rτt =0.095 k
τ
t+1,i=0.13 e
δ
t+1,ii=2.47 Other
τ
t =11.238 aθτ ,1=-2.33 c
δ
ii=0.96
rγd,t=0.068 k
τ
t+1,ii=0.11 e
τ
t+1,i=6.72 gαγ ,i,1=-0.09 zγ,1=-1.88 c
τ
i=0.03
rδd,t=0.068 π
γ
t+1,i=0.24 e
τ
t+1,ii=4.96 gαγ ,ii,1=-0.19 zδ,1=-1.14 c
τ
ii=0.27
E rτd,t=0.0725 π
γ
t+1,ii=-0.13
eRt+1,i=0.999 gβδ ,i,1=-0.09 zτ ,1=-0.24
µγd,t=xxx π
δ
t+1,i=0.42
eRt+1,ii=0.95 gβδ ,ii,1=-0.19 ui,1=3.59
µδd,t=xxx π
δ
t+1,ii=-0.05 µ
αγ
t =xxx gθτ ,i,1=-0.08 uii,1=3.55
µτd,t=xxx π
τ
t+1,i=1.58 µ
βδ
t =xxx gθτ ,ii,1=-0.19 c
γ
i =0.23
kγt+1,i=0.11 π
τ
t+1,ii=-0.18 µ
θτ
t =xxx
kγt+1,ii=0.08 e
γ
t+1,i=1.11 B¯=2.93
mγt=xxx d
φ
τ ,t=xxx v
αγ
t+1i=xxx ahb,3{∀h∈Hb}=1.41 A
τ
t = xxx ω=1
mδt=xxx d
γ
t=xxx v
βδ
t+1,i=xxx ahb,4{∀h∈Hb}=-0.68 e
γ
t=xxx ω(eω)=0.2
C mτt=xxx d
δ
t=xxx v
θτ
t+1,i=xxx A
γ
t=xxx e
δ
t=xxx ρt=0.0725
dφγ,t=xxx µ
τ
t=xxx GDPt+1,i=85.94 A
δ
t=xxx e
τ
t=xxx
dφδ,t=xxx
vα
γ
t+1,ii=0.9 v
γ
t+1,i=0.999 v
δ
t+1,ii=0.955 gh,i,2{∀h∈Hb}=0.005 λ
b
i{∀b∈B}=0.9 r
A
t =0.0775
vβ
δ
t+1,ii=0.9 v
γ
t+1,ii=0.95 v
τ
t+1,i=0.999 gh,ii,2{∀h∈Hb}=0.005 λ
b
ii{∀b∈B}=1.1 p=0.95
vθ
τ
t+1,ii=0.9 v
δ
t+1,i=0.999 v
τ
t+1,ii=0.95 gh,i,3{∀h∈Hb}=0.005 us,3{∀s∈S}=0.1 aαγ ,2=0.025
A GDPt+1,ii=82.51 gh,ii,3{∀h∈Hb}=0.007 zb,2{∀b∈B}=0.9 aβδ,2=-0.12
k
γ
t+1,s{∀s∈S}=0.15 zb,3{∀b∈B}=0.5 aθτ ,2=0.004
k
δ
t+1,s{∀s∈S}=0.2 zb,4{∀b∈B}=-0.1
k
τ
t+1,s{∀s∈S}=0.17 us,2{∀s∈S}=0.37
λbks{∀b∈B,s∈S}=0.1
Note: E, C, and A denote ‘Endogenously-Solved’, ‘Calibrated’, and ‘Arbitrarily selected’ , respectively.
The values of all banks’ balance sheet items in the initial period, t = 1997, i.e. {mbt , µbd,t,
Othersbt , A
b
t , µ
b
t , d
b
t , e
b
t}b∈B, are calibrated using the annual account data for UK banks as at
the end of 1997. We note that, at this point in time, banks γ and δ are net lenders whereas
bank τ is a net borrower in the interbank market.18 Based on the same source of data, we
calibrate the values of private agents’ loan repayment rates to their nature-selected banks in the
good/normal state of the next period, i.e. (vh
b
t+1,i){hb∈Hb}, using each bank b’s ratio of provision
at the end of 1998 to the corresponding value of total customer loans. However, since there
are no data available for crisis/extreme events, the default rates of all private agents in the
bad state (state ii) are arbitrarily set to 0.1.
The probability that state ii will occur, 1 − p, is chosen to be 0.05, given that it reflects
an extreme event. Since banks rarely default on their debt obligations in the good state, the
corresponding repayment rates in the deposit and interbank markets for all banks in the next
18Specifically, for t = 1997, µbtb∈{γ,δ} = 0, d
b
tb∈{γ,δ} > 0, µ
τ
t > 0, and d
τ
t = 0.
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period, i.e. vbt+1,i, b ∈ B, are set to 0.999. In state ii, the bad state, we arbitrarily set the
analogous repayment rates to 0.95 for bank τ and 0.955 for banks γ and δ. These values are
selected to be relatively higher compared with households’ repayment rates in state ii (0.9)
since in reality the probability that banks would default on their financial obligations is smaller
than that of households. Note also that the chosen value for banks γ’s and δ’s repayment rates
is slightly greater than that of bank τ because their deposit rates, whose values are determined
endogenously, are slightly smaller in equilibrium. This may suggest at first glance that we
are assuming what we need to estimate, i.e. a bank’s willingness to run a risky position,
which could lead to enforced shut down. Not quite so, since each chosen value for a bank’s
chosen default rate relates to an equivalent subjective default penalty. If you give us, the
model builders, some guidance on banks’ aversion to default penalties, i.e. the size of the
λbs, b ∈ B, s ∈ S, we can adjust the default probabilities accordingly.
We choose the value of the interbank interest rate, ρt, to be 7.25 percent to match with
the actual value of UK Repurchase (RP) rate in December 1997. The value of risk weight for
loans is set to 1 whereas the corresponding values for market book and interbank lending are
0.2. The values of capital to asset requirement set by the regulator for banks in both states of
the next period (k
b
t+1,s, b ∈ B, s ∈ S) is chosen to be slightly higher, but almost equal to, their
corresponding value in state i so that all banks always violate their capital requirement.19
The values of default and capital violation penalties (λbs and λ
b
ks, b ∈ B, s ∈ S) reflect
both the tightness of the regulator’s regulatory policy and the (subjective) aversion of banks’
managements to putting themselves at risk of default and/or regulatory violations, and can, in
principle, be treated as inputs given by the practitioner users of this model. Their values are,
however, unobservable and therefore have to be chosen somehow. We have chosen them in this
example to be consistent with the following outcomes. First, the resulting endogenously-solved
banks’ lending rates are such that all banks earn positive profit in state i, whereas they suﬀer a
loss in state ii. This in turn implies that banks’ capital in the next period (1998) deteriorates
if the bad state (ii) occurs. Second, all banks’ coeﬃcients of risk aversion (cbs, b ∈ B, s ∈ S) are
positive, implying that banks’ utility functions are well-behaved, i.e. concave. Lastly, the rate
of return on market book is arbitrarily chosen to be 7.75 percent, i.e. 50 basis points higher
than the interbank rate.
We calibrate the value of GDP in the good state of the next period to match with the
actual UK (annual) GDP in 1998. We set the value of GDP in the bad state to represent a 4%
fall from its corresponding value in the good state. The values of coeﬃcients ahb,3 and ahb,4,
∀hb ∈ Hb, in the reduced-form equation (10) are calibrated, respectively, using the values of the
long-run income and interest rate elasticities of UK household sector estimated by Chrystal
and Mizen (2001). Moreover, the coeﬃcient values of the time trend, ahb,2, ∀hb ∈ Hb, are
chosen appropriately to improve the empirical fit. Given the limited participation assumption
in the loan markets, the diﬀerence in these values reflect the variation in the rate of growth of
each borrowing group’s demand for loans.
To our knowledge, we do not know any empirical study which estimates deposit supply
and default probability functions for UK household/private sectors. Although this can, in
principle, be done, such an exercise is beyond the scope of this paper. So, we arbitrarily choose
the appropriate values of zb,2, zb,3, zb,4, ∀b ∈ B, in equation (11), and the values of ghb,s,2 and
19As mentioned in section 3.1, this is a simplifying assumption. Recall that capital requirements’ violation
penalty enters banks’ objective functions as ‘max[0, k
b−kbs]’. However, given our assumption that banks always
violate their capital requirement, we can restrict the optimisation problem to k
b−kbs > 0, thus avoiding ‘corner’
equilibria.
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ghb,s,3, ∀hb ∈ Hb, s ∈ S, in equation (12). As can be seen from table I, the values of ghb,i,3
is chosen to be greater than the corresponding values of ghb,ii,3, ∀hb ∈ Hb, implying that the
eﬀect of a ‘credit crunch’ is assumed to be stronger in the bad state.
The remaining parameters for which their values have to be chosen are the coeﬃcients us,2,
and us,3, ∀s ∈ S, in the reduced-form equation (13). We set the value of the latter to be equal
to 0.1. Finally, in order to improve the empirical fit, the value of the coeﬃcients of the time
trend in the reduced form GDP functions is set to 0.37.
Given the chosen values of the variables mentioned above, we are left with the system of
56 equations in 56 unknown variables. By solving such system, the values of all the remaining
variables are specified and a numerical solution to the model is obtained.
4.2 Simulation
As mentioned, in each period, banks in our model choose their loan supply, deposit demand,
interbank lending/borrowing, and default rates as their endogenous variables to maximise
their expected payoﬀ in the next period, where the expectation is taken over the two possible
states of nature. The optimisation problem takes as given the values of various exogenous
parameters/variables in the model, as shown in table I. So, in order to simulate how UK banks
endogenously change their optimal position in various markets over time, these values have to
be specified. We do so as follows:
We have chosen the values of various exogenous variables which are unobservable in practice
such as the coeﬃcients in the banks’ utility functions, default and CAR violation penalties
to be same as their corresponding values in the initial period (1997). Since the values of
the coeﬃcients in the banks’s utility functions are chosen such that they support the actual
calibrated values of banks’ balance sheet position in 1997, they arguably represent these banks’
risk-return preferences at the time.
Since our model does not endogenise the market investment book and ‘others’ item in bank
balance sheets, we also need to specify their values. We do so by calibrating them against the
real data in each period. Moreover, because the interbank rate serves as the Central Bank’s
monetary policy instrument in this model, we calibrate its values over the period using the
real data on UK RP rate at the end of each of the sample year. As in our initial period, the
rate of return on market book investment in each of the subsequent periods is then assumed
to be 50 basis points higher than the corresponding interbank rate.
As mentioned, because 1997 is our initial period, banks are endowed with some level of
capital, i.e. for t = 1997, ebt{∀b∈B}are exogenous in the model. However, in the subsequent
periods, bank capital becomes endogenous in the model. In particular, it is equal to the
amount that these banks initially brought to the table from the previous period plus any
retained earnings, where the actual value of the latter depends on the realisation of one of the
two possible states, s ∈ S. This crucially implies that the outcome from each bank’s optimal
decisions in each period can directly aﬀect its own as well as the other banks’ decisions in the
subsequent periods via their influence on accumulated bank capital. Since the UK financial
sector has been exceptionally sound over the sample period, we assume that the good state,
state i, has always been the actual realisation in each of the subsequent periods.
Given that the values of all the exogenous variables in the model are determined in each
of the period between 1998 to 2003 and that the corresponding value of bank capital is en-
dogenised, we are able to simulate the values of all banks’ choice variables over the sample
period, thereby allowing us to explore how these banks optimally change their positions in
various financial markets over the sample periods. In the next section, we show our simulation
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result.
5 Results
Figure 2 shows our simulation results and, where applicable, compares them with the real data.
Due to data confidentiality reasons, we cannot show the results for the two individual banks
(γ and δ) and only present the results for bank τ . We note, however, that the result for bank
τ in terms of its ability to track the real data over the sample period is generally a reasonably
good representation of that of the other two banks.20
As can be seen from the figure, the values of bank τ ’s market book, ‘others’, and the inter-
bank rate, all of which are exogenous in the model, are calibrated against real data throughout
the sample period. Our calibration procedure to generate realistic behaviour patterns for the
UK banks in the initial period implies that the simulated series for bank τ ’s loans, deposits, and
capital as well as Mr. θ’s repayment rate and GDP in the good state start oﬀ from exactly the
same points as their corresponding real data series. In the subsequent periods, we observe that
the simulated series for bank τ ’s loans, deposits and interbank borrowing exhibit an upward
trend, all of which track the real data reasonably well. This is primarily driven by the observed
downward trend of the interbank rate which represents the Bank of England’s accommodating
monetary policy over the sample period. Given a cheaper cost of interbank borrowing, other
things constant, bank τ borrows more from the interbank market and transfers these extra
liquidity to the loan market by extending more credit to Mr. θ. Thus, we observe a downward
trend on the simulated lending rate series. Moreover, given higher aggregate credit supply in
the economy, GDP in the following period rises. This underpins the observed upward trend for
the simulated GDP series which is almost identical to that observed in real data. Anticipating
higher GDP in the next period, household borrower (Mr. θ) repays more to bank τ in order
to reduce the extent of default penalties. Moreover, Mr. φ supplies more deposits with bank
τ , generating the observed downward trend in the deposit rate. In fact, the implied pattern of
the lending and deposit rates mimic that of the interbank market very closely.
Even though the simulated series for bank τ ’s net interbank borrowing exhibits a realistic
upward trend, it evidently appears to be quite volatile over the sample period. This is primarily
due to the observed discrepancy between the simulated series for bank τ ’s capital and its
coresponding real data. Given our assumption that banks always accumulate their profits as
retained earnings, we observe that the growth rate of the simulated series for bank τ ’s capital
is higher than that observed in the real data over the sample period. The resulting excess
capital, in turn, provides an additional income eﬀect to bank τ which may outweigh the initial
substitution eﬀect from the downward trend for the interbank rate. For example, in 2001, the
interbank rate fell relatively sharply, i.e. by 200 basis points. Given the resulting dominant
substitution eﬀect, we observe that bank τ ’s interbank borrowing increases considerably as
compared to the real data. However, in 2003, when the interbank rate fell by only 25 basis
point, the implied substitution eﬀect is not strong enough to outweigh the corresponding income
eﬀect arising from higher capital, causing bank τ ’s interbank borrowing to decrease relatively
more compared with the real data.
20We observe that the real data for banks γ and δ are relatively more volatile compared to that of bank τ .
This is mainly because the former two represent individual banks whereas the latter is the aggregate of the
remaining banks in the banking sector. The aggregation process for bank τ implies that various idiosyncracies
associated with individual banks cancel out.
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Figure 2: Simulation results vs. real data
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The observed upward trend in the simulated series of bank τ ’s capital implies that bank
τ ’s captal to asset ratio consistently increases over the sample period. Moreover, higher GDP
together with increased aggregate credit supply in the economy cause Mr. θ to repay more on
his loan obligations with bank τ over the period, though its rate of growth is slightly greater
that suggested by the real data. Finally, the simulated series for bank τ ’s repayment rate fell
slightly in 1999, compared to that of the previous period, and continuously increased from
then on, reaching 100% repayment rate in 2001. The reason for the observed fall in 1999 is
due to the slight fall in ‘others’ item in the previous period. This implies that bank τ had less
funds to invest in that period. So, it rationally took on a slightly riskier position, i.e. raising
the probability of default slightly, in both states of the next period in order to support its
corresponding expected profitability.
6 Conclusion
In Goodhart, Sunirand and Tsomocos (2003), we proposed a new approach to analyse financial
fragility. This approach has both rigorous and advanced microfoundations, as it incorporates
dynamic interaction among heterogeneous banks and investors, endogenous default, multiple
credit and deposit markets and a number of financial assets. Yet, as shown in Goodhart,
Sunirand, and Tsomocos (2004b), it is simple enough to be calibrated against real data at a
specific point in time, and to be implemented as a stress-testing tool for banks. Moreover, we
show in Goodhart, Sunirand, and Tsomocos (2004a) that a multitude of comparative statics
experiments can be conducted. For example, the interactions of monetary and regulatory
policies, and their relationship to financial fragility, can be analytically assessed, including the
consequences for welfare.
In this paper, we confirm the relevance and validity of our approach by showing that it can
replicate the time series properties of U.K. banking data satisfactorily. We do so by extending
the model to an infinite horizon setting, wherein the horizon over which a bank manager
optimises is shown to be finite. So, we claim that our approach is well-suited as a tool to
analyse financial fragility in the UK, or in principle any other, banking system not only because
it allows contagion eﬀects between heterogeneous agents to operate actively in equilibrium but
also because it can illuminate how such eﬀects may get amplified and propagated over time.
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